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Abstract
A real-time process algebra, enhanced with speci2c constructs for handling cryptographic
primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way. We show that some
security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting.
Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information 4ow-like
scheme, called timed generalized non-deducibility on compositions (tGNDC), parametric w.r.t.
the observational semantics of interest. We show that, when considering timed trace semantics,
there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the
protocol. Moreover, we present a couple of compositionality results for tGNDC, one of which
is time dependent, and show their usefulness by means of a case study.
c© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the formal analysis of crypto-
graphic protocols, as they have become the basic building blocks for many distributed
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services, such as home banking or electronic commerce. These analyzes have been
very successful in many cases, uncovering subtle inaccuracies in many speci2cations
of cryptographic protocols. However, such analyses are usually restricted to very high
abstractions of the real protocols, where concrete information about the timing of events
are usually omitted (with some relevant exceptions such as [2,23]).
Our starting point is the work on cryptographic security process algebra (CryptoSPA)
[7,10], which is an extension of SPA [5] (a CCS-like process algebra with actions
belonging to two diKerent levels of con2dentiality), with some new constructs for han-
dling cryptographic primitives. For such a language a general schema for the de2nition
of security properties, called GNDC, has been proposed [10]. It is based on the idea of
checking the system against all the possible hostile environments. The general schema
has the following form:
P satis2es S
/ iK ∀X ∈ Env : P‖X / 
(P);
where the general property S
/ requires that the system P satis2es (via the behavioral
pre-order /) a speci2cation 
(P) when composed in parallel with any possible hostile
environment (or enemy) X . The problem of the universal quanti2cation is overcome
when it is possible to show that there exists the “most powerful” enemy; hence, one
check against the most powerful enemy is as discriminating as an in2nity of diKerent
checks against all the possible enemies. This lucky case occurs when the behavioral
pre-order / is a congruence w.r.t. parallel composition and restriction, e.g., for trace
semantics.
The main goal of this paper is to show that the real-time information 4ow theory
developed for tSPA (a real-time extension of SPA reported in [9]), can be extended to
CryptoSPA, yielding timed CryptoSPA (tCryptoSPA). The main results from such
an eKort are the following:
– A language for describing cryptographic protocols, where information about the con-
crete timing of events is necessary, e.g., because of the presence of timeouts or
time-stamps.
– A general scheme, called timed generalized non-deducibility on compositions
(tGNDC), for describing uniformly the many security properties in a real-time set-
ting; we will present three instances of such a general scheme, namely timed au-
thentication, timed integrity and timed secrecy.
– Some speci2c results for the security properties based on semantics that are pre-
congruences, such as the existence of a (real-time) most general enemy.
Moreover, we will propose some compositionality results, i.e., we will show some
conditions under which secure real-time protocols can be safely composed. In particular,
we show that under some conditions on the knowledge that a protocol accumulates
during its lifetime, the tGNDC property is compositional; in one case, such a condition
is time dependent, hence more easily applicable to real-life case studies.
As a running example, we will consider the timed version of the Wide-Mouthed
Frog protocol (WMF). The choice has been driven by its simplicity; nonetheless, the
WMF protocol is expressive enough to discuss some interesting issues, e.g., the timed
version of authentication, integrity and secrecy.
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The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we de2ne the tCryptoSPA syntax
and its operational semantics. In Section 3 we de2ne the general schema tGNDC,
hence the notion of hostile environment (or enemy) and we present some general
results, such as the existence of a real-time most general enemy. In Section 4 we
present some security properties, namely tNDC, timed authentication, timed integrity
and timed secrecy. Section 5 reports some results about conditions for safe composition
of real-time security protocols. In Section 6 we report some concluding remarks and
a comparison with related literature. Finally, in the appendix, we give some detailed
proofs.
2. The model
In this section we present the model we will use for the speci2cation of cryptographic
protocols and security properties. It is a real-time extension of the CryptoSPA proposed
in [10,7]. In CryptoSPA it is possible to express qualitative ordering among events,
while quantitative timing aspects cannot be expressed. Thus, we extend CryptoSPA
with operators that permit to express the elapsing of time.
2.1. The syntax of the language
We call the language timed cryptographic security process algebra (tCryptoSPA
for short). Its syntax is based on the following elements:
– A set Ch of channels, partitioned into a set I of input channels (ranged over by c)
and a set O of output channels (ranged over by Mc, the output corresponding to the
input c);
– A set M of messages;
– A set Var of variables, ranged over by x;
– A set Const of constants, ranged over by A.
The set L of tCryptoSPA terms (or processes) is de2ned as follows:
P ::= 0 | c(x):P | Mce:P | !:P | tick:P |P + P |P‖P |P\L|
A(e1; : : : ; en) | [〈e1; : : : ; er〉 rule x]P | &(P);
where e; e1; : : : ; er are messages or variables and L is a set of channels. Both the
operators c(x):P and [〈e1 : : : er〉 rule x]P bind the variable x in P.
Besides the standard (value-passing) CCS operators [19], we have an additional
pre2x action tick, used to model time elapsing, a delay operator &(P), used to make
lazy the initial actions of P, and the operator [〈m1 : : : mr〉 rule x]P introduced in order
to model message handling and cryptography. Informally, process [〈m1 : : : mr〉 rule x]P
tries to deduce a piece of information z from the tuple of messages 〈m1 : : : mr〉 through
one application of rule rule; if it succeeds, then it behaves like P[z=x], otherwise it is
stuck. See the next subsection for a more detailed explanation of the inference rules.
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The time model we use is known as the ;ctitious clock approach, see e.g. [24].
A global clock is supposed to be updated whenever all the processes agree on this,
by globally synchronizing on action tick. All the other actions are assumed to take
no time. This is reasonable if we choose a time unit such that the actual time of an
action is negligible w.r.t. the time unit. Hence, the computation proceeds in lock-steps:
between global synchronizations on action tick (that represent the elapsing of one time
unit), all the processes proceed asynchronously by performing actions without duration.
Let Def :Const→L be a set of de2ning equations of the form A(x1; : : : ; xn) def= P,
where P may contain no free variables except x1; : : : ; xn, which must be distinct. Con-
stants permit us to de2ne recursive processes, but we have to be a bit careful in using
them. A term P is closed w.r.t. Def if all the constants occurring in P are de2ned
in Def (and, recursively, for their de2ning terms). A term P is guarded w.r.t. Def if
all the constants occurring in P (and, recursively, for their de2ning terms) occur in a
pre2x context [19].
The set Act= {c(m) | c∈ I}∪ { Mcm | Mc∈O}∪ {!}∪ {tick} of actions (! is the internal,
invisible action, tick is the special action used to model time elapsing) is ranged over
by a (with abuse of notation), while l ranges over Act\{tick}. We call P the set of all
the tCryptoSPA closed terms (i.e., with no free variables), that are closed and guarded
w.r.t. Def . We de2ne sort(P) to be the set of all the channels syntactically occurring
in the term P. Moreover, for the sake of readability, we always omit the termination
0 at the end of process speci2cations, e.g., we write a in place of a:0.
We give an informal overview of tCryptoSPA operators:
– 0 is a process that does nothing;
– c(x):P represents the process that can get an input m on channel c behaving like P
where all the occurrences of x are replaced by m (written P[m=x]);
– Mcm:P is the process that can send m on channel c, and then behaves like P;
– !:P is the process that executes the invisible action ! and then behaves like P;
– tick:P is a process willing to let one time unit pass and then behaves as P;
– P1 + P2 (choice) represents the non-deterministic choice between the two processes
P1 and P2; time passes when both P1 and P2 are able to perform a tick action—
and in such a case by performing tick a con2guration where both the derivatives
of the summands can still be chosen is reached—or when only one of the two
can perform tick—and in such a case the other summand is discarded; moreover,
!-pre2xed summands have priority over tick pre2xed summands.
– P1‖P2 (parallel) is the parallel composition of two processes that can proceed in an
asynchronous way but that must synchronize on complementary actions to make a
communication, represented by a !. Both components must agree on performing a
tick action, and this can be done even if a communication is possible;
– P\L is the process that cannot send and receive messages on channels in L; for all
the other channels it behaves exactly like P;
– A(m1; : : : ; mn) behaves like the respective de2ning term P where all the variables
x1; : : : ; xn are replaced by the messages m1; : : : ; mn;
– [〈m1; : : : ; mr〉 rule x]P is the process used to model message handling and cryptog-
raphy;
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Fig. 1. An example inference system for shared key cryptography.
– &(P) (idling) allows process P to wait inde2nitely. At every instant of time, if
process P performs an action l, then the whole system proceeds in this state, while
dropping the idling operator.
2.2. The operational semantics of tCryptoSPA
The data handling part of the language consists of a set of inference rules used to
deduce messages from other messages.
Denition 1. We consider a set of relations among closed messages as: r⊆Pfin(M)
×M, where r is the name of the rule. Given a set R of inference rules, we consider
the deduction relation DR⊆Pfin(M)×M. Given a 2nite set of closed messages, say
*, then (*;M)∈DR if M can be derived by iteratively applying the rules in R. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that r (for each r ∈R) and DR⊆Pfin(M) ×M
are decidable.
Note that the tCryptoSPA syntax, its semantics and the results obtained are com-
pletely parametric w.r.t. the inference system in use. We present in Fig. 1 the same
inference system of [10]. This inference system can combine two messages obtaining
a pair (rule pair); it can extract one message from a pair (rules fst and snd); it can
encrypt a message m with a key k obtaining {m}k and 2nally decrypt a message of
the form {m}k only if it has the same key k (rules enc and dec). In this framework,
cryptography is completely reliable, i.e., a crypted message can be deciphered only
by knowing the suitable decryption key and can be produced only by knowing the
key, too.
In a similar way, the inference system can contain rules for handling the basic
arithmetic operations and Boolean relations among numbers.
Example 1. Natural numbers may be encoded by assuming a single value 0 and a
function symbol S, with the following rule:
n
S(n)
inc
So we will often use n + 1 to indicate the application of rule inc with n as
argument. Similarly, we can de2ne summations and other operations on natural
numbers.
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Remark 1. It is worthy noticing that during the security analysis we will allow enemies
to initially know only a given set of messages. All the other messages will be deduced
by using a given set of inference rules. This is useful for many purposes. For instance,
this gives us a way to model fresh nonces creation. Indeed, one may give to each
participant in a protocol a diKerent seed for generating nonces and using a rule similar
to the one for modeling natural numbers to produce nonces. The enemies will not
initially know neither the seed nor the rule for creating the nonces. In such a way, the
enemy may obtain a nonce only by receiving it.
Example 2. We do not explicitly de2ne equality check among messages in the syntax.
However, this can be implemented through the usage of the inference construct. For
example, consider rule
n n
Equal(n; n)
equal:
Then [m=m′]A (with the expected semantics) may be equivalently expressed as
[m m′ equal y]A where y does not occur in A. Similarly, we can de2ne inequal-
ities, e.g., 6 among natural numbers.
The operational semantics of tCryptoSPA is described by means of the labeled
transition system (lts for short) 〈P; Act; { a→}a∈Act〉, where { a→}a∈Act is the least re-
lation between tCryptoSPA processes induced by the axioms and inference rules of
Fig. 2. Such a relation is well-de2ned even if negative premises occur in a rule for
the idling operator and in one rule for +, because the relation is strictly strati;able
[15]. Note that tCryptoSPA is tick-deterministic i.e., the time elapsing never moves
a process to two diKerent states. The proof of the following proposition can be easily
given by inspecting the operational rules. In particular, the 2rst two rules of the idling
operator and the rules for non-deterministic choice are the key rules enforcing time
determinacy.
Proposition 1. For every tCryptoSPA process P we have
If P tick→ P′ and P tick→ P′′; then P′ = P′′:
Example 3. In tCryptoSPA there are processes, such as 0, that do not allow time to
proceed; hence, as rule ‖3 for parallel composition forces a global synchronization on
tick actions, the eKect of composing a process P with 0 is to prevent P from letting
time pass. In other words, 0 acts as a time annihilator for its parallel context. On
the contrary, &(0) is a process that, even if functionally terminated, lets time proceed
inde2nitely. Hence, &(0) acts as a neutral element for parallel composition.
Example 4. Consider a process P=(&(a)‖&( Ma))\a that can perform any sequence (pos-
sibly empty) of tick actions followed by a !. It is worth observing that, contrary to
tSPA [9], we do not assume maximal communication progress, i.e., !’s do not have
priority over tick actions or, equivalently, a process cannot idle if it can perform a !.
Hence, in tSPA process P can perform only the sequence !.
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Fig. 2. Structured operational semantics for tCryptoSPA (symmetric rules for +1;+3; ‖1; ‖2 and \L are
omitted).
Example 5. We can easily model timeout constructs in tCryptoSPA.
Assume n16n2 and de2ne a process
Time out(n1; n2; A; B) = tickn1 :&(A) + tickn2 :!:B:
By looking at the rules for choice and idling, we see that Time out(n1; n2; A; B) 2rst
performs a sequence of n1 tick actions; then, the system may perform other n2−n1 tick
actions, unless A resolves the choice by performing an action; instead if A does nothing,
after n2 units of time, through the execution of action !, the process is forced to act
as B. Note that rule +3 is responsible for preventing the selection of process A at time-
out expiration. This semantics for the + operator is diKerent from the one in tSPA (a
tick action can be performed only if both summands can do so) and is motivated by the
need of a more 4exible way of programming the choice between diKerent components.
Remark 2. Note that an attempt to de2ne the & operator as a derived one, e.g. &P = tick:
&P + P would fail because of the de2nition of the + operator that does not allow tick
actions when P can perform a ! action (see rule +3).
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Fig. 3. tCryptoSPA speci2cation for the WMF protocol.
2.3. The WMF protocol
As a simple example, we recall the WMF protocol. The aim of the protocol is to
establish a session key from an initiator A to a responder B by means of a server S
and using shared key cryptography. The protocol, as reported in [3], is as follows:
(1) A→ S : A; {B; Ta; Kab}Kas ,
(2) S→B : {A; Ts; Kab}Kbs ,
where Ta and Ts are timestamps, Kas (Kbs) is the key shared between A and S (B and
S), and Kab is the new session key. Both the server S and the responder B check the
timestamp. If it is too old, the message (hence, the session key) is ignored.
In order to model this protocol in tCryptoSPA, we use a process Clock, counting the
time elapsing, to which other processes can ask for the current time value. Moreover,
we use [〈m;m′; m′′〉 trd x] as a shorthand to extract m′′ and also [t6t′]P, which we
assume to have an inference system that handles the Boolean relations on arithmetic
expressions. With cXY we denote the channel used by X to communicate with Y and
vice versa. The complete speci2cation is reported in Fig. 3. The lts of P(Kab) is
reported below, where, for the sake of clarity, each ! labeled transition is decorated
also with the channel on which the synchronization takes place and, possibly, with the
modi2ed value of the timestamps:
P(Kab)
!;time;Ta=0→ : tick→ : !;cAS→ : !;time;Ts=1→ : tick→ : !;cBS→ : !;time;Tb=2→ : tick→ : !→ :
This protocol takes two time units to perform the distribution of the key. At the third
time unit, A and B are ready to use the session key.
3. A general schema for the denition of timed security properties
In this section we propose a general schema for the de2nition of timed security
properties. We call it tGNDC, since it is a real-time generalization of generalized
NDC (GNDC for short) [10], which is in turn a generalization of non-deducibility
on compositions (NDC for short) [5]. The main idea is the following: a system P is
tGNDC
/ iK for every hostile environment (or enemy) X the composition of the system
P with X satis2es the timed speci2cation 
(P). Essentially, tGNDC
/ guarantees that
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the timed property 
 is satis2ed, with respect to the / timed behavioral relation, even
when the system is composed with any possible enemy.
This section is organized as follows. We 2rst de2ne timed trace semantics (the
behavioral semantics of main interest) and timed (bi-)simulation. Then, we discuss
the issue of hostile environments, showing that it is necessary to restrict their initial
knowledge. Finally, we present the tGNDC schema and some general results of it,
some of which are independent of the chosen behavioral notion.
3.1. Behavioural semantics
Here we de2ne the semantic pre-order and equivalence we will use to formalyze
security properties, timed trace pre-order and equivalence, the timed version of the
classical untimed semantics.
The expression P⇒P1 is a shorthand for P( !→)∗P1 where ( !→)∗ denotes a (pos-
sibly empty) sequence of ! labeled transitions; the expression P a⇒P′ is a shorthand
for P⇒P1 a→P2⇒P′. Let 2= a1; : : : ; an ∈ (Act\{!})∗ be a sequence of actions; then
P
2⇒P′ iK there exist P1; : : : ; Pn−1 ∈P such that P a1⇒P1 a2⇒; : : : ; Pn−1 an⇒P′.
Denition 2. For any P ∈P the set T (P) of timed traces associated with P is de2ned
as follows T (P)= {2∈ (Act\{!})∗ | ∃P′:P 2⇒P′}. The timed trace pre-order, denoted
by 6ttrace, is de2ned as follows: P6ttraceQ i> T (P)⊆T (Q). P and Q are timed trace
equivalent, denoted by P=ttrace Q, if T (P)=T (Q).
As an example, it is easy to see that T (P(Kab))= {4; tick; tick tick; tick tick tick},
where 4 denotes the empty sequence.
We de2ne the concept of timed weak simulation as usual.
Denition 3. We say that a relation R among processes is a timed weak simulation,
if for every (P;Q)∈R we have:
– If P a→P′; a = !, then there exists Q′ s.t. Q a⇒ Q′ and (P′; Q′)∈R.
– If P !→P′, then there exists Q′ s.t. Q⇒Q′ and (P′; Q′)∈R.
If R and R−1 are weak timed simulations then R is called timed weak bi-simulation.
Let ≺ (≈) the union of all timed weak simulations (bi-simulations) among processes.
Then, we have ≺⊆6ttrace and so ≈⊆=ttrace.
3.2. Hostile environments
Here we characterize the notion of admissible hostile environments, similar to what
is done in [10] for the untimed setting. Such a characterization is necessary to analyze
protocols where some information is assumed to be secret, as in cryptographic proto-
cols. A hostile environment, or enemy, is a process which tries to attack a protocol by
stealing and faking information which is transmitted on public channels, say C. Such
an agent is modeled as a generic process X which can communicate only through
channels in C, imposing some constraints on the initial data that are known by the
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Fig. 4. De2nition of I(P; V ):
enemy and requiring that such a protocol is weakly time alive, i.e., the agent may
always perform tick eventually. Otherwise X could prevent time from elapsing when
composed in parallel with some system, since in a compound system time can pass iK
all components let it pass. So the enemy could block the time 4ow and we want to
avoid this unrealistic case. Let Der(P) be the set of all derivatives of P, i.e., all the
P’s reachable from P through a sequence of actions in Act.
Denition 4. A process P is directly weakly time alive i> P tick⇒ P′. P is weakly time
alive i> for all P′ ∈Der(P), we have P′ is directly weakly time alive.
It is useful to de2ne the set of messages that a process initially knows, i.e., ID(P).
Given a process P, we call ID(P) the set of messages that appear in P. More formally,
we de2ne ID(P) as I(P; ∅), where I :P× 2Const→ 2M is given in Fig. 4. Informally,
I(P; V ) is a function that recursively visits the sub-terms of P and the body of the
constants in use. The argument V is used to check that the unwinding of a constant
de2nition is performed only once.
Let *⊆M be the initial knowledge we would like to give to the enemies, i.e., the
public information such as the names of the entities and the public keys, plus some
possible private data of the enemies (e.g., their private key or nonces). For some enemy
X , we want all the messages in ID(X ) to be deducible from *. If this is not the case,
then an enemy would be unrealistic, as it would know in advance the secrets. We thus
de2ne the set tE*IC of timed hostile processes as
tE*C = {X ∈ P | sort(X ) ⊆ C and ID(X ) ⊆ D(*) and X is weakly time alive}:
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3.3. The tGNDC schema
In this section we formally de2ne the tGNDC
/ family of properties. We will use
A‖CB as a shorthand for (A‖B)\C. The proposed family of security properties is as
follows.
Denition 5. P is tGNDC
/ iK ∀X ∈ tE*IC : (P‖CX ) / 
(P) where /∈P×P is a pre-
order, C is a set of channels and 
 :P →P is a function between processes de2ning
the property speci2cation for P as the process 
(P).
We propose a suQcient criterion for a static characterization (i.e., not involving
the universal quanti2cation ∀) of tGNDC
/ properties. We will say that / is a pre-
congruence w.r.t. ‖C if it is a pre-order and for every P;Q;Q′ ∈P if Q / Q′ then
P‖CQ / P‖CQ′. Thus it is easy to prove the following:
Proposition 2. If / is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖C and if there exists a process Top∈
tE*IC such that for every process X ∈ tE*IC we have X / Top, then ∀
:
P ∈ tGNDC
/ i> (P‖CTop) / 
(P):
Proof. (⇐) If / is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖C , then X /X ′ implies (P‖CX ) / (P‖CX ′).
Thus if for every process X ∈ tE*IC we have X /Top then we will also have (P‖CX ) /
(P‖CTop) for every process X ∈ tE*IC and so, as by hypothesis (P‖CTop) / 
(P), we
obtain (P‖CX ) / (P‖Top) / 
(P); ∀X ∈ tE*IC , i.e., P is tGNDC
/ .
(⇒) By de2nition of tGNDC
/ , since Top∈ tE*IC .
In particular, if the hypotheses of the proposition above hold, then it is suQcient
to check that 
(P) is satis2ed when P is composed with the most general hostile
environment Top. This permits to make only one single check, in order to prove that
a property holds for all possible attackers. We also have the following corollary for
the congruence induced by /.
Corollary 1. Let / be a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖C and let ≡= / ∩ /−1. If there exist
two processes Bot;Top∈ tE*IC such that for every process X ∈ tE*IC we have Bot/X/Top
then
P ∈ tGNDC
≡ i> (P‖CBot) ≡ (P‖CTop) ≡ 
(P):
Given these very general results, we show that they can be rephrased in the model
we presented so far. Indeed, this is the case of the trace pre-order 6ttrace, which is a
pre-congruence.
Proposition 3. Timed trace pre-order is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖C .
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Proof. Given P;Q;Q′ ∈P such that Q6ttraceQ′, we have to prove P‖CQ6ttraceP‖CQ′.
This can be done by induction on the length of the timed traces generated by P‖CQ.
Note that in the tSPA model, timed trace pre-order is not a pre-congruence, since
the semantic rules enforce the so-called maximal communication progress, i.e., when a
communication is possible it must start immediately, and it is not possible to perform
a tick [9].
Now we single out the minimal element Bot and the maximum element Top in tE*IC
w.r.t. 6ttrace. As for Bot, it is clear that the minimum set of traces is generated by
the weakly time alive process that does nothing, i.e., by process &(0). As a matter of
fact, (P‖&(0))=ttrace P for timed trace equivalence and most other equivalences. We
thus de2ne the Top element 1 using a family of processes TopC;*ttrace each representing
an instance of the enemy with knowledge *:
TopC;*ttrace =
∑
c∈C
&(c(x):TopC;*∪{x}ttrace ) +
∑
c∈C;m∈D(*)
&( Mcm:TopC;*ttrace):
The initial element of the family is TopC;*Ittrace as *I is the initial knowledge of the
enemy. This may accept any input message to be bound to the variable x which is
then added to the knowledge set that becomes *I ∪{x}, and may output only messages
that can pass on the channel c and that are deducible from the current knowledge set *
via the deduction function D. Furthermore, it can let time pass. Note that ! summands
are not considered, as inessential for trace pre-order. We may prove the following:
Proposition 4. If X ∈ tE*C then X6ttraceTopC;*ttrace.
Proof. By induction on the length of the timed traces generated by X .
4. Some timed security properties
In this section we show how to rede2ne four timed security properties as suitable
instances of the tGNDC
/ schema, by suitably de2ning function 
. As for the behavioral
semantics /, we will always consider the timed trace semantics. The four properties
we consider are:
– The timed version of NDC [5], which has been proposed to study information 4ow
security; we will show that tNDC is the strongest property in the tGNDC
/ family,
under some mild assumptions.
– A timed notion of authentication, called timed agreement (see also [17]), according
to which agreement must be reached within a certain deadline, otherwise authenti-
cation does not hold.
1 A similar de2nition has been given for non-interference analysis in [5] and for security protocols analysis
in [22].
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– A timed notion of secrecy, we call timed secrecy, according to which a message
is secret only within a time interval and after the deadline it can become a public
piece of information.
– A timed notion of integrity, called timed integrity, which simply requires a correct
delivery of messages within a certain amount of time.
4.1. tNDC
We start with tNDC since tGNDC
/ is a generalization of such a property. The
underlying idea is that the system behavior must be invariant w.r.t. composition
with every hostile environment. Indeed, there is no possibility of establishing a
communication (i.e., sending information). In the CryptoSPA untimed setting the
NDC 2 idea can thus be de2ned as follows (see [10]):
Denition 6. P ∈NDC iK ∀X ∈E*IC , we have (P‖CX )=trace P\C. Where =trace is trace
equivalence and the only diKerence with the de2nition given in SPA is that the knowl-
edge of process X is bounded by *I .
Now we present timed NDC (tNDC, for short) [9] which is the natural extension
of NDC to a timed setting.
Denition 7. P ∈ tNDC iK ∀X ∈ tE*IC we have (P‖CX )=ttrace P\C. Where the diKer-
ence is that we use the timed hostile environment and timed trace equivalence.
Note that tNDC corresponds to tGNDCP\C=ttrace . It is also possible to apply Corollary 1
obtaining the following static characterization.
Proposition 5. P ∈ tNDC iK (P‖CTopC;*Ittrace)=ttrace P\C.
Now we suggest that tNDC is the most restrictive 
(P), hence inducing the strongest
property for timed trace semantics. The most restrictive 
(P) should return an encap-
sulation of protocol P, i.e., a version of P which is completely isolated from the
environment, corresponding to the execution of P in a perfectly secure network where
only the honest parties are present. In our process algebra setting, this corresponds to
the restriction of all public channels in C along which protocol messages are sent.
Note that for every process P we have (P‖&(0))\C =ttrace P\C. This means that P
restricted on C is equivalent to the protocol in composition with the enemy that does
nothing. Note also that, by de2nition, &(0)∈ tE*C for every *. So it is very natural to
consider functions 
 and processes P such that P\C6ttrace
(P). This simply means
that the protocol P is correct (as it satis2es its speci2cation 
(P)) at least when it is
not under attack. This condition can somehow be seen as a reasonable criterion for
any good protocol: it must be correct at least when it is not under attack! Under this
mild assumption, it is clear that P ∈ tNDC implies P ∈ tGNDC
6ttrace .
2 As for tGNDC
/ , also NDC and tNDC are implicitly parametric w.r.t. the set C of public channels and
the set *I of initial knowledge. We usually omit these parameters when clear from the context.
36 R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 23–49
This form of reasoning shows one of the main advantages of the GNDC idea, that
tries to unify concepts from diKerent areas such as information 4ow and cryptographic
protocol analysis. The uniform schema, in this paper extended in a timed setting, allows
us to easily compare diKerent security properties.
Another way to avoid universal quanti2cation over all the admissible enemies is
to show the equivalence between tNDC and timed strong non-deterministic non-
interference (tSNNI for short); such an equivalence result holds in the untimed case [5],
but it does not hold for tSPA [9] because of the maximal communication assumption
of that language.
A CryptoSPA process is SNNI*C if P\C, where all actions in C are forbidden,
behaves like the system P where all the actions in C are hidden (i.e., transformed into
internal ! actions). To express this second system we need to introduce 2rst the hiding
operator P=*C:
P a→ P′
P=*C a→ P′=*C
(a ∈ C ∪ MC)P
Mcm→ P′ c ∈ C ∪ MC
P=*C !→ P′=*∪{m}C
P
c(m)→ P′ c ∈ C ∪ MC m ∈ D(*)
P=*C !→ P′=*C
Now we are ready to de2ne the property timed SNNI*C as follows.
Denition 8. A process is tSNNI*C if P\C =ttrace P=*C.
It is rather intuitive that P=*C can be seen as P‖CTop, where Top is the top element
of the trace pre-order for CryptoSPA. Hence, such a static characterization can be seen
as a corollary of the existence of a top element in the trace pre-order (together with
the fact that trace pre-order is a pre-congruence).
Proposition 6. For every P ∈P we have that (P‖CTopC;*ttrace)=ttrace P=*C.
Proof. We have to prove (P‖CTopC;*ttrace)6ttraceP=*C and the symmetric relation ((P‖C
TopC;*ttrace)6ttraceP‖CTopC;*ttrace). These can be done by induction on the length of the
traces generated by the left-hand-side processes.
Proposition 7. P ∈ tNDC*C i> P ∈ tSNNI*C .
Proof. By Propositions 5 and 6.
We can also extend the bi-simulation strong non-deterministic non-interference
(BSNNI for short) property de2ned in [5] in our setting.
Denition 9. A process is tBSNNI*C if P\C ≈P=*C.
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Indeed, this property requires that the equivalence used to compare P\C and P=*C
is timed weak bi-simulation. We can prove a result similar to Proposition 6.
Proposition 8. For every P ∈P we have that (P‖CTopC;*ttrace)≈P=*C.
Proof. By checking that the following relation is a timed weak bi-simulation:
R = {(P‖CTopC;*ttrace; P=*C) |P ∈P; * ⊆M}:
Unfortunately, we cannot prove a proposition as Proposition 5. As a matter of fact,
also in the case without cryptography and time, it is not true that checking a system
only against the Top process is enough to avoid the universal quanti2cation (e.g. see
[5]).
However, checking tBSNNI*C may be an eQcient method for checking tSNNI
*
C . In-
deed, we have tBSNNI*C ⊆ tSNNI*C and timed weak bi-simulation is decidable in poly-
nomial time for 2nite processes, while checking trace inclusion is a PSPACE-complete
problem.
4.2. Timed Agreement
We now present the Timed Agreement property [17]:
“A protocol guarantees Timed Agreement between a responder B and an initiator
A on a set of data items ds if, whenever B (acting as responder) completes
a run of the protocol, apparently with initiator A, then A has previously been
running the protocol, apparently with B, in the last n ticks (where n is a pre2xed
timeout value) and the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to
all the variables in ds, and each such a run of B corresponds to a unique run
of A.”
As done in [10] for the non-real-time version of Agreement, what we do is to have
for each party an action representing the running of a protocol and another one repre-
senting its completion. We consider an action commit res(B; A; d) representing a cor-
rect termination of B as a responder, convinced to communicate with A that agrees
on data d. On the other hand, we have an action running ini(A; B; d) that repre-
sents the fact that A is running the protocol as initiator, apparently with B, with data
d. If we specify these two actions in the protocol, the Timed Agreement property
requires that when B executes commit res(B; A; d), then A has previously executed
running ini(A; B; d) and at most n tick actions, where n is the pre2xed timeout value,
occurred between these actions. We assume that the actions representing the running
and the commit are correctly speci2ed in the protocol. We can see them as output ac-
tions over two particular channels running ini and commit res. We assume that d can
assume values in a set D. Let NotObs(P)= sort(P)\(C ∪{running ini; commit res})
be the set of channels in P that are not public and that are diKerent from running ini
and commit res, i.e., that will not be observed. Function 
t(n)tAgree can be thus de2ned
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as follows:
P′(x; y) =
∑
d∈D;i∈0::n
&(running ini(x; y; d):tick1::ticki:commit res(y; x; d):&(0));
P′′ =
∑
c∈NotObs(P)
&(c(x):P′′) +
∑
c∈NotObs(P);m∈M
&( Mcm:P′′);

t(n)tAgree(P) = P
′′‖P′(A; B):
Note that P′′ is essentially the process that executes every possible action over channels
in sort(P) which are not in C and that are diKerent from running ini and commit res,
or let time pass. Given P, 
t(n)tAgree(P) represents the most general system which satis2es
the Timed Agreement property and which has the same sort of P. In fact in 
t(n)tAgree(P)
action running ini(x; y; d) always precedes commit res(y; x; d) for every datum d, and
every combination of the other actions of P can be executed. Finally, the number
of tick actions is at most n. In order to analyze more than one session, it suQces
to consider an extended 
 which has several processes P′ in parallel. Note that only
actions like running ini and commit res are relevant for the agreement analysis.
We desire that, even in the presence of a hostile process, P does not execute traces
that are not in 
t(n)tAgree(P). So we can give the following de2nition:
Denition 10. P satis2es Timed Agreement i> P is tGNDC

t(n)tAgree(P)
6ttrace , i.e.,
∀X ∈ tE*IC : (P‖CX )6ttrace
t(n)tAgree(P):
Example 6. We consider here the WMF protocol presented in Section 2.3. In this
speci2cation we consider a server that can receive requests from both A and B as
initiators. Note that time parameter n is 3 because in a correct execution 3 ticks are
performed in between running ini and commit res.
Clock(n) = tick:Clock(n+ 1) + time n:Clock(n);
A(K) = time(Ta):running ini(A; B; K):tick: McAS{B; Ta; K}Kas :&(0);
B = &(cBS(y)[〈y; Kbs〉 dec z]time(Tb):tick:[〈z〉 snd t][t + 16Tb]
[〈z〉 trd w]commit res(B; A; w));
S = tick:cAS(u):[〈u; Kas〉 dec z]time(Ts):tick:[〈z〉 snd t][t + 16Ts]
[〈z〉 trd x] McBS{A; Ts; x}Kbs :S
+tick:cBS(u):[〈u; Kbs〉 dec z]time(Ts):tick:[〈z〉 snd t][t + 16Ts]
[〈z〉 trd x] McAS{B; Ts; x}Kas :S;
P(Kab) = (Clock(0)‖A(Kab)‖B‖S)\{cAS ; cBS ; time}:
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Unfortunately, this protocol could be attacked by an intruder P in the following way:
(1) A→ S : A; {B; Ta; Kab}Kas .
(2) S→E(B) : {A; Ta + 1; Kab}Kbs .
(3) E(B)→ S : B; {A; Ta + 1; Kab}Kbs .
(4) S→E(A) : {B; Ta + 3; Kab}Kas .
(5) E(A)→ S : A; {B; Ta + 3; Kab}Kas .
(6) S→B : {B; Ta + 5; Kab}Kbs .
Indeed, the protocol P, in parallel with the enemy E, produces the following trace:
running ini(A; B; Kab):tick:tick:tick:tick:tick:commit res(B; A; Kab)
that is not in 
t(n)tAgree since the number of ticks is greater than n=3. Note that, in fact,
the actions running ini(A; B; Kab) and commit res(B; A; Kab) are correctly executed, but
the enemy forces B to accept an old key. In an untimed setting this would be a
correct execution of the protocol. The problem here is, on the one hand, that the
message produced by S can easily be used by the enemy to start a new run of the
protocol having as initiator the intended receiver of the previous run, and on the
other hand that, when B receives the key, he has no way to know when A forged
it.
4.3. Timed Secrecy
We now present the Timed Secrecy property:
“A protocol guarantees to an initiator A the property of Timed Secrecy on a set
of data items ds within a time n if, whenever a data item in ds becomes public,
at least n ticks passed since A started the protocol.”
As for Timed Agreement, what we do is to have an action representing the running of
a protocol and another one representing a secret being revealed. We consider an action
running ini(A; d) that represents the fact that A is running the protocol as initiator,
with datum d. On the other hand, we have an action public(d) representing that data
item d is made public. If we specify these two actions in the protocol, the Timed
Secrecy property requires that when someone executes public(d) then A has executed
running ini(A; d) and at least n tick actions, where n is the pre2xed timeout value,
occurred between them. We assume that the actions representing the running and the
publication are correctly speci2ed in the protocol. We can see the 2rst action as an
output over a particular channel running ini. The second action, following the approach
of [6] is performed by a particular process called key expired noti;er (KEN ) that reads
from a public channel c not used in the protocol and performs the output of what it
has read on the channel public, i.e., KEN = c(x):public(x).
Let NotObs(P)= sort(P)\(C ∪{c; running ini; public}) be the set of channels in P
that are not public and that are diKerent from running ini and public, i.e., that will not
be observed. We assume that d can take values in a set of secret values D. Function
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t(n)tSec can be thus de2ned as follows:
P′(x) =
∑
d∈D
&(running ini(x; d):tick1 : : : tickn:(&(public(d):&(0)) + &(!:&(0))));
P′′ =
∑
c∈NotObs(P)
&(c(x):P′′) +
∑
c∈NotObs(P);m∈M
&( Mcm:P′′);

t(n)tSec(P) = P
′′‖P′(A):
Given P, 
t(n)tSec(P) represents the most general system which satis2es the Timed Secrecy
property and which has the same sort as P. In fact, in 
t(n)tSec(P), the action public(d)
may be executed only after n ticks from the action running ini(x; d) for all data d, and
every combination of the other actions of P can be executed. In order to analyze more
than one session, it suQces to consider an extended 
 which has several processes P′
in parallel.
We want that even in the presence of a hostile process, P does not execute traces
that are not in 
t(n)tSec(P). So we can give the following de2nition:
Denition 11. P satis2es timed secrecy i> P is tGNDC

t(n)
tSec(P)
6ttrace , i.e.,
∀X ∈ tE*IC : (P‖CX )6ttrace
t(n)tSec(P):
Example 7. We consider the following protocol:
(1) A→ S : A; {B; Ta; Kab; Exp}Kas ,
(2) S→B : {A; Ts; Kab; Exp′}Kbs ,
which is a variant of the WMF Protocol in which we add a 2eld Exp used to state how
long the key will last before expiring. After that time the key is no longer valid and
will be made public by B. Both the server S and B check the value Exp and upgrade
it according to the amount of time passed. c is the public channel used to throw away
expired keys, while KEN is the process that we use to write on the private channel
public.
We assume that we have two servers that update the 2eld Exp in a diKerent way.
In particular server S2 decreases at double speed (w.r.t. S1) the key expiration time,
so that it is possible to have secure keys that will last less.
Clock(n) = tick:Clock(n+ 1) + time n:Clock(n);
A(K) = time(Ta):running ini(A; K):tick: McAS1{B; Ta; K; n}Kas :&(0);
B = &(cBS(y)[〈y; Kbs〉 dec z]time(Tb):tick:[〈z〉 snd ts][〈z〉 trd w]
[〈z〉 frt t][t − (Tb − ts)60] Mcw);
KEN = &(c(x):public(x));
S = S1‖S2;
R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 23–49 41
S1 = &(cAS1 (u):[〈u; Kas〉 dec z]time(Ts):tick:[〈z〉 snd ta][〈z〉 trd x]
[〈z〉 frt t][1 ¡ t − (Ts − ta)] McBS{A; Ts; x; t − (Ts − ta)}Kbs :tick);
S2 = &(cAS2 (u):[〈u; Kas〉 dec z]time(Ts):tick:[〈z〉 snd ta][〈z〉 trd x]
[〈z〉 frt t][0 ¡ t − (Ts − ta)]
McBS{A; Ts; x; t − 2 ∗ (Ts − ta)}Kbs :tick);
P(Kab) = (Clock(0)‖A(Kab)‖B‖S‖KEN )\{cas; cbs; c; time}:
An enemy E, by using server S2, could make the key appear as expired to the intended
recipient, by simply redirecting to server S2 the message intended for server S1. We
suppose that n=4. The enemy could attack the protocol in the following way:
(1) A→E(S1) : A; {B; 0; Kab; 4}Kas .
(2) E(A)→ S2 : A; {B; 0; Kab; 4}Kas .
(3) S2→B : {A; 1; Kab; 2}Kbs .
As B receives the third message and upgrades the value of Exp, it becomes 1 and so
the key will be made public even if only 3 ticks passed.
The protocol P composed in parallel with enemy E could produce the following
trace:
running ini(A; Kab):tick:tick:tick:public(Kab)
that is not in 
t(n)tSec since the number of ticks is less than n=4.
4.4. Timed Integrity
We now present the Timed Integrity property:
“A protocol guarantees to the user B the property of Timed Integrity on a set of
data items ds within a time n if B only accepts data items in ds and this may
only happen in at most n ticks since the beginning of the protocol.”
For instance, imagine that you would like to receive your favorite newspaper each day
before noon. This may be expressed as an integrity property rather than an authenticity
one, since you are not actually interested in the sender but simply in the data (the
newspaper). Consider a channel out used for expressing the reception of a message
and let NotObs(P)= sort(P)\(C ∪{out}) be the set of channels in P that are not public
and let d range over a set of data D. Then, Timed Integrity may be formally speci2ed
as follows:
P′(y; n) = ‖d∈Dtick1: : : : :tickn:!:&(0) + &(out(y; d):&(0));
P′′ =
∑
c∈NotObs(P)
&(c(x):P′′) +
∑
c∈NotObs(P);m∈M
&( Mcm:P′′);

t(n)tInt (P) = P
′′‖P′(B; n):
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5. Compositional analysis
In this section we illustrate some compositional proof rules for establishing that a
system enjoys a tGNDC property, in particular tSNNI*C . However, remember that as it
is equivalent to tNDC, this property implies all the other ones based on trace semantics,
that are the most frequently used in security analysis.
A compositional proof rule for checking a property f works as follows: in order to
check if a system P‖Q satis2es f it is enough to check whether both P and Q satisfy
f. Compositional reasoning is useful in many cases. For instance, an interesting 2eld
of application is the analysis of systems with an arbitrary number of equal components.
Let us consider the parallel composition of multiple instances of process P:
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
P‖ : : : ‖P
To prove that this system enjoys f (for whatever n) it is suQcient to prove that P
enjoys f.
Within the SPA theory, SNNI is compositional, i.e., if P;Q∈ SNNI then (P‖Q)∈
SNNI . Unfortunately, the same does not hold when considering enemies with limited
knowledge, as for tSNNI*C . For instance, consider the processes:
P = c1m1:c2(x)[x = m2]:c3m2; Q = c1m2:c2(x)[x = m1]:c3m1:
Now, assuming C = {c1; c2} and *= ∅, we have that P;Q∈ tSNNI*C . However, P‖Q ∈
tSNNI*. As a matter of fact, (P‖Q)\C is equivalent to 0, while (P‖Q)=*C may perform
both c3m1 and c3m2. The problem is the following: The information acquired by an
intruder interacting with one process is useful to interfere with the other one.
However, if we strengthen the assumptions we can get a compositional rule for
establishing that a process belongs to tSNNI*C . The stability assumption we make is
that the process cannot signi2cantly increase its knowledge.
Denition 12. We say that a process P is stable w.r.t. *, whenever if P=*C
2⇒P′=*′C
then D(*)=D(*′).
Stability (w.r.t. a knowledge *) is a compositional property.
Proposition 9. Assume that P;Q∈ tSNNI*C and that P;Q are stable w.r.t. *. Then
P‖Q is stable w.r.t. *.
This is useful to show the compositional principle on the whole observational be-
havior of the processes.
Proposition 10. Assume that P;Q∈ tSNNI*C and that P;Q are stable w.r.t. *. Then
P‖Q∈ tSNNI*C .
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Proposition 11. Assume that P;Q∈ tBSNNI*C and that P;Q are stable w.r.t. *. Then
P‖Q∈ tBSNNI*C .
Example 8. We consider a simple example of the application of the principle above.
Consider the processes P= Mc{m}k :0 and Q= c?x:[x k dec z]!. Consider also the pro-
cess KEN ′= c?x:[x=m]:public m. Assuming *= {{m}k} and C = {c}, we can estab-
lish that P;Q; KEN ′ ∈ tSNNI*C and are all stable; hence P‖Q‖KEN ′ ∈ tSNNI*C , which
means that P‖Q keeps m secret. As a matter of fact, we have
(P‖Q‖KEN ′)\C =ttrace 0:
We may derive a proof principle for the tGNDC
6ttrace schema, again under the as-
sumption that the involved processes are stable.
Proposition 12. Given the set of initial knowledge * and the set of public channels
C, assume Pi ∈ tGNDC
i(Pi)6ttrace , with i=1; 2, and P1; P2 to be stable w.r.t. *. It follows
that P1‖P2 ∈ tGNDC
1(P1)‖
2(P2)6ttrace and P1‖P2 is stable w.r.t. *.
Proof. The proof follows by noticing that (P1‖P2)=*C6ttraceP1=*C‖P2=*C. Then, by
hypothesis and Proposition 6, we have Pi=*C6ttrace
i(Pi), with i=1; 2, and the thesis
then follows because 6ttrace is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖.
Note that whenever 
(P1)‖
(P2)6ttrace
(P1‖P2) then we get a compositional proof
rule for tGNDC
.
Example 9. Consider the following family of processes S(i), each sending a message
(mi; i) after every time unit:
S(i) = &(tick:[(mi; i) pkA enc z]: Mcz:S(i + 1)):
Consider also a family of receivers of this kind:
R(i) = tick:c(y)[y pk−1A dec t][t snd t2][t2 = i][t fst t1]out t1:R(i + 1):
Basically, we have (S(0)‖R(0))\C, where C = {c}, is trace included into Spec(0)
where
Spec(i) = tick:out mi:Spec(i + 1):
Consider *= {{(mi; i)}pkA | 06i}∪ {pkA} as the intruder’s knowledge set. Then, we
have that S(0) and R(0) are stable w.r.t. * and S(0)∈ tNDC*C , with S(0)\C =ttrace &(0),
and R(0)∈ tGNDCSpec(0)6ttrace . By Proposition 12, we have
(S(0)‖R(0)‖Top*C)\C6ttrace&(0)‖Spec(0)6ttraceSpec(0):
44 R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 23–49
5.1. Time-dependent stability and compositional results
We give a new result about conditions for safe composition of cryptoprotocols where
time plays an essential role. In order to achieve this result, we should re2ne the concept
of stability given above, by introducing time-dependent stability.
In the previous section we noticed that if we assume that the intruder knowledge
does not increase when composing the intruder process with P (i.e., P‖X ) and with Q
(i.e., Q‖X ) (using the same communication channels) then the intruder knowledge does
not increase when composing the intruder itself with the process P‖Q. Unfortunately,
such a form of stability is not time-dependent and so it is unsuited to check properties
based on a timed notion of secrecy. This does not make it feasible to check protocols
such as 9TESLA [21], whose security features exactly depend on a form of timed
secrecy. To clarify this point consider the following example.
Example 10. The process P= tick: Mck:&(0) keeps the secrecy of k for one time unit. In
the more complex process Q=(c(x):[x= k]: Mcm)+ tick:&(0) the secrecy of k in the 2rst
time unit is crucial to get the secrecy of m. Indeed, either Q is willing to receive the
key k only in the 2rst time unit (if so, it releases m) or it starts to idle. Unfortunately,
each stable set * must contain the message k, and so also the message m. Thus, our
compositional proof principles cannot be applied. However, we may note that if we
could reason about stability in each time slot then we can re2ne the proof principle in
order to cope with such cases.
We let 2 be a sequence of actions (possibly empty) ranging over Act\{!}. Let #tick(2)
be the number of occurrences of tick actions in the sequence 2. The following new
de2nition will allow us to cope with timed secrecy and security properties of protocols
that rely on it.
Denition 13. We say that a process P is time-dependent stable (t.d. stable) w.r.t.
the sequence {*i}i¿0 if, whenever (P‖X*0 )\C
2⇒ (P′‖X ′*′)\C and #tick(2)= i, then
D(*′)=D(*i).
Basically, a process P is t.d. stable when an enemy cannot increase signi2cantly its
knowledge when P runs in the space of a time slot.
The following propositions hold.
Proposition 13. Given a sequence {*i} and a set of public channels C, assume P1; P2
to be t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}. It follows that P1‖P2 is t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}.
Proposition 14. Assume that P;Q∈ tSNNI*C and that P;Q are t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}.
Then P‖Q∈ tSNNI*C .
Proposition 15. Assume that P;Q∈ tBSNNI*C and that P;Q are t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}.
Then P‖Q∈ tBSNNI*C .
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Proposition 16. Given a sequence {*i} and a set of public channels C, assume Pr ∈
tGNDC
r(Pr)6ttrace with 16r62. Assume also Pr to be t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}. It follows that
(P1‖P2)∈ tGNDC
1(P1)‖
2(P2)6ttrace .
Example 11. Consider again the processes in Example 10. We have that P and Q
are t.d. stable w.r.t. *0 = {∅}, *i =D({k}) for i¿1. Then, P‖Q is t.d. stable w.r.t.
{*i}i¿0 (by Proposition 13) and so m will never belong to the knowledge of the
intruder (whose initial knowledge is ∅).
Using time-dependent stability, we were able to check timed secrecy and timed
integrity for a relevant protocol such as 9TESLA in [14].
6. Conclusions
We have shown how to extend the GNDC schema to a real-time setting while
preserving the properties of the untimed schema. In particular, we have shown the ex-
istence of the “most powerful” timed enemy, at least for the timed trace semantics. We
have also shown how to express uniformly in this general schema some timed security
properties, such as timed non-deducibility on compositions, (one de2nition of) timed
authentication, timed secrecy and timed integrity. We have also introduced a compo-
sitional proof principle that allows us to safely compose two security protocols, while
preserving the security properties they enjoy. Such a compositional proof principle has
been extended to cope with real time. One may wonder if the stability condition is
too restrictive. As a matter of fact, our compositional proof principles can be suc-
cessfully applied for checking security properties, e.g., message integrity, in stream
signature protocols as the ones in [4,11,20,21]. See [13,14,18] for some preliminary
results.
Related literature on real-time security include the prominent papers [23,2]. The
former paper presents tock-CSP (a real-time language similar to tSPA) that is used
to specify real-time cryptographic protocols. The main diKerences consists of a dif-
ferent treatment of timed operators, in the absence of a mechanism for handling
crypto-primitives, in the lack of a uniform schema, and in the absence of compo-
sitionality results. The latter paper [2] is mainly concerned with the model check-
ing of the interesting case study of TESLA, a protocol for stream broadcasting over
the Internet. The main focus is on showing that it is possible to give a 2nite model
for the unbounded supply of fresh cryptographic keys used during the pro-
tocol. The so-called security condition of the protocol is similar to timed
agreement.
Compositional proof techniques for reasoning about cryptographic protocols in an
untimed setting may be found in [1,16]. In [1], a compositional proof system for
an environment-sensitive bi-simulation has been developed. One main diKerence with
our approach, is that we consider a weak notion of observation where the internal
actions are not visible. This permits us to have more abstract speci2cations. (As a
matter of fact, the authors of [1] leave as future work the treatment of such a form of
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weak equivalence.) In [16], the authors develop the concept of disjoint encryption and,
under this hypothesis, are able to perform compositional reasoning both for secrecy
and authentication properties. While on the one hand, their approach seems to deal
better with authentication properties than ours, on the other one it seems that there are
situations where stability holds while disjoint encryption does not. We leave as future
work a comparison of the eKectiveness of the diKerent approaches for compositional
analysis of security properties.
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Appendix. Proofs
Here we present some detailed proofs omitted from the main body of the paper. The
other proofs are similar to those presented here.
Proposition 13. Given a sequence {*i} and a set of public channels C, assume P1; P2
t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}. It follows that P1‖P2 is t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that *ci =D(*i), for each i. By contra-
diction, consider a computation 2 s.t.
(P1‖P2‖X*0 )\C
2⇒ (P′′1 ‖P′′2 ‖X*′′)\C
and D(*′′) =D(*i)=*i. Then, it means that P1‖P2 outputs at least one message m s.t.
m ∈ *i. Let m1 be the 2rst (and last) of such messages sent during the computation
under consideration. Assume, without loss of generality, that m1 has been sent by P1.
Thus, we must have:
(P1‖P2‖X*0 )\C
2′⇒ (P′1‖P′2‖X*i)\C Mcm1→ (P′′1 ‖P′′2 ‖X*′′)\C:
During the pre2x of the computation, P2 emitted over channels in C only messages in
*i, for each time slot i. Otherwise P2 would not be t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}i¿0. So,
the trace may be simulated by P1 in composition with X*i . But this implies that
(P1‖X*0 )\C
2⇒ (P′′1 ‖X*′′)\C and D(*′′) =D(*i). This leads to a contradiction since
we assumed P1 t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}i¿0. The generic case with an arbitrary number
of processes can be proved by induction (on the number n of processes).
Proposition 16. Assume that P1 and P2 are t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}; then,
(P1‖P2‖Top*0 ) \ C6trace(P1‖Top*0 ) \ C‖(P2‖Top*0 ) \ C:
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Proof. The proof consists in checking that the following relation is a weak simulation:
R= {((P′‖P′′‖Top*i) \ C; (P′‖Top*i) \ C‖(P′′‖Top*i) \ C) |
×(P1‖P2‖Top*i) \ C
2⇒ (P′‖P′′‖Top*i) \ C; #tick(2) = i}:
– Assume (P′‖P′′‖Top*i)\C
am→ (P′1‖P′′‖Top*i)\C due to a transition P′
am→P′1, with
a ∈C. Then, also (P′‖Top*i)\C‖(P′′‖Top*i)\C
am→ (P′1‖Top*i)\C‖(P′′‖Top*i)\C.
If the transition is due to a receiving action by P′ or one of the processes performs
an internal computation then the reasoning is similar.
– Assume (P′‖P′′‖Top*i)\C
!→ (P′1‖P′′1 ‖Top*i)\C due to a transition P′
am→P′1 and
P′′
a(m)→ P′′1 . If a ∈C then the case is easy. Otherwise, since m∈D(*i) (recall that
P′1‖P′′1 is t.d. stable), we have that (P′‖Top*i)\C
!→ (P′1‖Top*i)\C and (P′′‖Top*i)
\C !→ (P′′2 ‖Top*i)\C. Thus, we get
(P′‖Top*i) \ C‖(P′′‖Top*i) \ C
!→
(P′1‖Top*i) \ C‖(P′′‖Top*i) \ C
!→
(P′1‖Top*i) \ C‖(P′′1 ‖Top*i) \ C:
The case of synchronization between P′ (P′′) and Top*i is a simpli2ed instance of
the previous case.
– Assume(P′‖P′′‖Top*i)\C
tick→ (P′1‖P′′1 ‖Top*i+1)\C is due to a time synchronization,
i.e., P′ tick→ P′1, P′′ tick→ P′′1 and Top*i
tick→Top*i+1 . Then, (P′‖Top*i)\C
tick→ (P′1‖Top*i+1)
\C and (P′1‖Top*i)\C
tick→ (P′′1 ‖Top*i+1)\C (due to time stability of P1 and P2 and
henceforth of P′ and P′′). Thus, we get
(P′‖Top*i) \ C‖(P′′‖Top*i) \ C
tick→ (P′1‖Top*i+1) \ C‖(P′′1 ‖Top*i+1) \ C:
We can generalize the previous result as follows.
Lemma. Assume that {Pj}j=1;:::; n are t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}i¿0; then,
(P1‖ : : : ‖Pn‖Top*0 ) \ C6trace(P1‖Top*0 ) \ C‖ : : : ‖(Pn‖Top*0 ) \ C:
Proof. By induction on n. The base case is trivial. The case n+ 1 may be treated as
follows:
(P1‖ : : : ‖Pn‖Pn+1‖Top*0 ) \ C 6trace Lemma 16;
(P1‖ : : : ‖Pn‖Top*0 ) \ C‖(Pn+1‖Top*0 ) \ C 6trace Induction hypothesis;
(P1‖Top*0 ) \ C‖ : : : ‖(Pn+1‖Top*0 ) \ C:
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Proposition 15. Assume that P;Q∈ tBSNNI*C and that P;Q are t.d. stable w.r.t. {*i}.
Then P‖Q∈ tBSNNI*C .
Proof. The proof may be done by checking that the relation R in the proof of Propo-
sition 16 is actually a timed weak bi-simulation.
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